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to contract away their judgment on corporate matters and then permit
a group having enough influence to control the directors to do that
very thing, possibly against their better judgment. Although the
plaintiff is left without remedy, public policy should discourage the
formation of any such contracts by refusing to enforce them.
LABOR LAW
"LABOR DISPUTE" AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Coal miners filed claims for benefits under the Kentucky Un-
employment Compensation Act for a period when they did not work
because of failure of mine operators and union representatives to
agree on a new contract, the existing contract having expired. The
Kentucky statute excluded from benefits those employees who left
employment because of strike or other bona fide labor dispute. The
trial court reversed the decision of the Commission and directed it
to pay unemployment compensation. Held, reversed. A "labor dis-
pute" existed within the meaning and intent of the statute.'
As the term "labor dispute" in the Kentucky Unemployment Com-
pensation Act was not defined, the court used the definition found
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The term "labor dispute" includes
any controversy concerning terms or conditions or employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or con-
ditions of employment.2 An almost identical definition is found in
the National Labor Relations Act.4
The Labor Relations Acts were passed for the declared purpose
of encouraging the "friendly adjustments of industrial disputes" and
of eliminating "forms of industrial strife and unrest" which result
from the refusal of employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining, because of obstructing interstate commerce by impairing
the flow of raw materials into the channel of commerce. 5 Its theory
is to give free opportunity for negotiation between employer and em-
ployee which is likely to promote industrial peace and bring about
agreements which the act in itself did not attempt to compel.8 The
public policy of the Norns-LaGuardia Act declared it is necessary
'Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W. (2d) 929 (1940), cert. denied,
10 U.S.L. wEEK 3119. To the same effect see Ex parte Pesnell, 240
Ala. 457, 199 So. 726 (1941).
2"The entire subject is in its infancy. We may, however, hope
for further clarification of the meaning of the term "labor dis-
pute" in connection with unemployment insurance legislation. The
increasing number of cases involving contested rights to unemploy-
ment insurance benefits have revealed remarkable generalities in
present legislation and the need for more careful terminology in
the light of the many novel situations." TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940) §44, p. 107.
347 STAT. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. §113 (c) (1932).
449 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A §152 (9) (Supp. 1938)
5 Id. at §151.
O NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937); see
Jefferey-De Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F (2d) 139 (C.C.A.
4th, 1937).
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that the worker have full freedom of association, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he should be free
from interference or coercion of employers of labor or through agents
for the purpose of collective bargaming.7 More especially, the Act
explicitly formulated the public policy of the United States in regard
to the industrial conflict.8 The Kentucky Act was said to be enacted
as a part of a national plan of unemployment compensation and
social security.9 Yet if the term "labor dispute" is defined as is in
the two preceding Acts by the Courts, the parties involved will be
disqualified while conforming to the declared public policy. To de-
prive an indigent worker of unemployment compensation because he
attempts to use the method' o of peaceful collective bargaining with
his employer will in affect nullify both the National Labor Relations
Act" and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In allowing claims of the
bituminous miners, Maryland and Minnesota admitted that the sit-
uation was embraced within the federal and state anti-injunction stat-
utes, but held that the definition of "labor dispute" was not inter-
changeable. The individual and personal character of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law and the clear collective and group type of
the other (Labor Relations Act) make the term "labor dispute" not
interchangeable in the two connections. 2 Unemployment Compensa-
tion Insurance is in character a form of insurance 3 for the unem-
ployed worker, is remedial in nature and should be construed in his
favor.14 It is a contradiction of purposes to fail to narrow the con-
cept of a "dispute" so as to exclude peacefully conducting negotiations
unaccompanied by picketing or boycotting.15 Furthermore, it should
be noted that the definition of "labor dispute" in the Norris-La Guardia
is specifically said to be "When used in this Chapter and for the
purposes of this Chapter."' 6
747 STAT. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. §102 (1932).
8 U.S. v. Hutchenson, 61 Sup. Ct. 453 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union v. Lobe Valley Farm Products, Inc., 61 Sup. Ct. 122 (1941).
9 Ky. Acts 1938, c. 50.
1o Strikes are the necessary concomitants of an effective bargaining
process which will achieve and maintain adequate wages, hours,
and working conditions. See REPORT OF COMMISSION OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN (submitted to Sec. of Labor, Aug. 25,
1938) 89 and Appendix E (strike statistics).
"149 STAT. 457, §13 (1935), 29 uS.C.A. 163 (Supp. 1938). Nothing
in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike. See NLRB v. Rem-
ington Rand, 94 F. (2d) 862 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1938). This section
expressly preserves the right to strike and that includes a strike
for refusing to negotiate as well as any other cause.
iiFierst and Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes
(1940) 49 yALE I. T. 461 passim.
13 Employee contributions of 1% in Kentucky, California, and New
Jersey: 0.5% in Louisiana; 1.5% in Rhode Island.
14 Dep't of Industrial Relations v. Drummonds, 1 So. (2d) 395 (Ala.
1941).
Is Fierst and Spector, supra note 12, at 462 et seq.
16 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. §113 (1932).
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However, the term "labor dispute" is susceptible to a number of
interpolations, depending upon the economic predilections of the
courts.1 7 It has been held by some courts that payments of benefits
to workers involved in a "labor dispute" would impair the neutrality
of the unemployment compensation agency. Far greater weight, how-
ever, is likely to be attributed to the fact that, actuarial difficulties
would present a serious obstacle to any effort to include unemploy-
ment caused by "labor disputes" among compensable risks.8 As 401,000
men scattered through fifteen states were idle from six to sixteen
weeks no doubt such expenditures would be tremendous. However,
with appeals still pending in many states, miners' claims have been
allowed in six states and dis-allowed in nine.19
A Tennessee court held that for purposes of Unemployment In-
surance Law, the employee-employer relationship had terminated with
the contract on March 31, 1939, and no labor dispute could exist in
absence of that relationship,2o while in other states it was held work-
ers had gone out on an "industrial strike" and were denied benefits.2
Cases on which the Kentucky Court heavily relies are not cases
dealing with unemployment compensation, but with labor mjunctions 22
and decided several years before the Clayton Act was enacted 2 and
before the national policy was declared by the Norns-La Guardia Act.
Even though the Kentucky Act has been affirmed by the Social Se-
curity Board24 it is difficult to reconcile the interests of the two acts,
particularly with reference to a section of the Social Security Act
which declares that compensation shall not be denied to any otherwise
eligible individual for refusing to accept new work if the position
offered is vacant due directly to a labor dispute.25
It seems strange and especially ominous for organized labor that
present unemployment insurance legislation should reach back for
its standard to a time when all strikes were either illegal or subject
to legal coercion at the suit of the employer.26 In light of the de-
clared public policy it seems that the court should have narrowed the
concept of "labor dispute" so as to exclude peacefully conducting
negotiations from the disqualifying clause of the Kentucky Unem-
ployment Compensation Act and have allowed the miners' claims.
17 FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR DISPUTE (1930) c. 4.
is Pribrom, Compensation for Unemployment During Industrial Dis-
putes (1940) 51 MON. LAB. REV. 1375 et seq.
i9 N. Y. Times, April 3, 1939, p. 2, col. 2.
2o 50 UNITED MINE WORKERS J. 18 (1939).
2149 MON. LAB. REv. 693 (1939).
2 Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45 (C. C. A.
7th, 1908).
23 38 STAT. 730, 15 U.S.C.A. §12 (1914), Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443, 484 (1921).
24 Personal correspondence with Thomas C. Billig, Assistant to the
General Counsel, Federal Security Agency.
25 49 STAT. 640, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (5) (1935).
26 Schindler, Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance Legis-
lation (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 858 passim.
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